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1. Introduction 
Alpern and Schneider [I] proposed a new cryptographic technique in which th; 
security lies in hiding the idendty of the message's originator. This technique, 
keyless cryptography, is similar to public-key cryptosystems [5] in that it transmits 
keys using the data channels. This points to its suitability for use in computer 
networks. 
The security is a function of the nature of the computer system and its capability 
to hide the sender's identity. The application given in [I] is a protocol which 
allows two users to create a random key and prevent other users or eavesdroppers 
from getting its value assuming we have an anonymous channel, that is, a channel 
which perfectly hides the message originator. 
"Ve suggest some extensions to the original scheme. In section 2 we summanze 
the Alpern-Schneider protocol and in section 3 we show how to implement the key 
distnbution in a more realistic environment which is a semi-anonymous channel, a 
channel which IS not totally secure and the message origin IS hidden only with a 
given probabilit.y. In section 4 we suggest some extensions to the original scheme 
v'ihich solve problems proposed by its inventors. 
2. A Key Generation Protocol Over an Anonymous Channel 
The following protocol and its implementations were given in [11. 
The Key Generation Protocol: 
step 1: User A chooses a secret random bit string K,,(0), ... ,K,,(2n-1). 
User 8 chooses a secret random bit string Kb(0), ... ,Kb(2n-1) 
step 2: For i= 0 to 2n-1 do simultaneously: 
A transmits 'Concerning Kab my ith bit is: Ka(i)'; 
8 transmits 'Concerning Kab my itb bit is: Kb(i)'; 
step 3: For 1.= 0 to 2n-1 do 
if K,,(i)= Kb(i) then delete the i-th bit from the string; 
By convention the common key Kab is the remaining bits in K
IL
• The bits are 
chosen at random. Therefore, on the average there are' n bits in Ka.b' The process 
can be repeated if a larger key is desired. 
end {protocol} 
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Since any eavesdropper gets the synchronized transmissions 10 step 2 
slm ultaneously over an anonymous channel, he can not detect which bit is A's and 
which is B's. This implies the perfect secrecy of Ka.b' The users change their key 
from time to time to maintain the communication security. 
Three implementations of the protocol were suggested in [IJ: a centralized version 
consists of a central key distribution facility (a central trusted process with a 
blackboard); and two distributed versions: a broadcast network (e.g. a ring, an 
Ethernet or a satellite network) and a special communication channel consisting of 
two wires connecting any couple of users. 
3. A Secure Key Generation Over a Semi-Anonymous Channel 
In an environment where we have semi-anonymous channels, the ongm of some of 
the bits may be detected (for example by wiretappers who may occasionally notice 
the dIfference III signal propagatIon). Assume that the probability of a bit being 
detected is €. Then on the average, ne of the key's bits are not hidden, and as a 
consequence large portions of the messages are not secure. In order to get a better 
hidden key we propose the following protocol: 
The Secure Key Generation Protocol: 
step I: For i:=l to r do the key generation protocol resulting In a random 
key I( j. 
ab' 
21( I( IIi\ step : ab:= ab 'Q:1 ...... @ K r a.b ' (The @ IS the 'exclusive-or' 
operation) 
end {protocol} 
We observe that If the j-th bit in any of the r strings (Ka.bi(j) i=l,r) is secure, 
then Kab(j) is secure. A.s a result the fraction of bits which are not hidden, on the 
average, IS €r This means that choosing fairly small r gives a highly secure key 
(choose r such that the expected number of insecure bits ne r <I/2) For example, if 
f=1/2 and n=100, choosing r=8 gives a key in which all bits are likely to be 
secure 
3 
4. Extending the 'Keyless Protocol' 
In this section we show how small modifications of the original system can solve 
some problems presented in the original paper [1] making the keyless cryptography 
system more secure and more useful. 
4.1. A Fixed Key Distribution And Its Applications 
In [1] Alpern and Schneider say that while the keyless cryptography system can 
disgUlse data during transmission, they have been unable to devise a scheme using 
keyless cryptography to encrypt data for secure storage. Analysing the problem, it 
seems that the difficulty arises because the key generated by the protocol is a 
random one (a function of the random choices of both users), while data is stored 
using predetermined keys. The following simple observation enables a user A to 
transfer a secure fixed key Ko to B: First A and B generate a random key K R, 
then A transmits Ko (f>KR . Ko can be any block cipher or DES key (see [6] 
chapter 6). If A's data files are encrypted by Ko then the key transfer is a way to 
implement a granting of a read capability to these files (see [2] chapter 4). 
Another important property of a key distribution system is its ability to support 
secure computer conferencing, that is, the distribution of a key to a group of users. 
For example it was shown in [3J and [4] how to generate keys for all subsets of 
users from a linear number of keys, and in [9] it was shown that a public key 
based on the factorization problem (like RSA [8]) can be distributed to a group. In 
the keyless cryptosystem a user can distribute a fixed group key KG to a selective· 
group of users by repeating the fixed key distribution protocol independently with 
each of its mem bers: The user generates together with the ith member a random 
key KR. and then sends him KG (i)KR •. 
I I 
4.~. PreHnting Active Wiretapper Attacks Using 't-.tutual Authentication' 
In II I the authors say that all the keyless cryptography protocols that they have 
been able to devise appear to be vulnerable to an active wiretapper attack. Only 
one attack was described with the original protocol: the wiretapper can not delete 
messages, and all users are active all the time. This attack can be frustrated since 
when A and B exchange keys, A will detect more than one message transmitted 
concurrently if C pretends to be B. User C can, however, pretend to be B while B 
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is temporarily detached from the network (or forced off by C), in which case C 
would get the key and the secure information that A wants to transmit to B. \Ve 
notice that SInce the protocol is performed in synchronized time slots, it should be 
easy to protect by adopting the authentication tag technique. 
If both users share a secure, very long, one time authentication string of bIts 
(S(i),i=O,I, .. ), when they simultaneously transmit the ith bit of their keys, they also 
exchange an authentication pair (S(2i),S(2i+I)). This gives both users a mutual 
authenticatioll, k bit transmission is authenticated with probability 1-(1/2"). This 
probability indicates perfect authentication (analogous to the perfect secrecy of one 
time pad). This looks unrealistic since S has to be transmitted over the network 
first. \Ve can, however, approximate this authentication in the keyless cryptosystem 
by trading authentication quality for feasibility, and communication bandwidth for 
transmission of authentication bits. Users can generate authentication bits the same 
way that key bits are generated. This enables the design of a system which is 
imm une to active wiretapper attacks. 
The first short segment of the authentication string is distributed to A and B by 
a trusted authentication server [7], implemented as the central version of the keyless 
cryptosystem described in [1] (section 3.1). (Its job is analogous to that of the 
trusted public directory in a public-key system, since after the initiation the system 
becomes totally distributed.) We cannot provide authentication for each newly 
generated bit since each new bit requires 4 authentication bits on the average and 
the generated string is substantially shorter than the authentication string used. 
Therefore the users transmit packets of a fixed length, each of which consists of an 
authentication bit followed by some random bits. Since the first bit of each packet 
IS known a priori only to both users, they achieve mutual authentication, and the 
probability of a successful attack is 1/2 per packet. Letting the number of packets 
be large enough makes the probability of a successful attack on the protocol 
negligible. \Vhenever A and B generate a new key some of the generated bits do 
not serve as key bits. Rather, they become the authentication strings for the next 
key exchange. When the key length is k and p packets are used (for example: 
k=lOO, p=20), (2k/p)+4 random bits are included in a packet. 2(k+2p) random 
bits are exchanged in total, out of which k+2p on the average are secure, k are 
used as the new key and 2p as new authentication bits. The probability of a 
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successful attack IS Ij:!.p. 
5. Conclusions 
\Ve identified some problems in the keyless cryptography system. In practical 
systems (for example a broadcasting network) it is very hard to get an anonymous 
channel environment. The importance of our protocol is that we can amplify the 
security of the key in more realistic semi-anonymous channel environments. The 
problems of the randomness of the system's key and the system's vulnerability to an 
active wiretapper attack limit its security and applicability as well. Our solutions 
to these problems make the system more attractive. 
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